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Summer: Aerojet Takes a Dive After Over Twelve Years of Flight

NOTE: AEROJET TAKES A DIVE AFTER
OVER TWELVE YEARS OF FLIGHT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Uniformity in patent law, which was a major driving force behind
the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, may be injeopardy. Although the Federal Circuit has allowed
patent claims raised in responsive pleadings to serve as a basis for its
appellate jurisdiction for the previous twelve years, the United States
Supreme Court's recent holding in Holmes Group,Inc. v. VornadoAir
Cooling CirculationSystems, Inc.' halts this practice. Consequently,
forum shopping and races to the courthouse may ensue, which, in turn,
may produce a significant loss of uniformity in patent law.
Part II of this Note sets forth the background against which
Holmes was decided. Part III critiques the Supreme Court's analysis
in Holmes and examines the likely consequences of the Court's ruling.
Finally, Part IV concludes that the sole method of remedying the
negative effects of Holmes is through a legislative revision of the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. Part IV also offers suggested
revisions of the statutes governing the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Establishing the FederalCircuit

The Federal Circuit was established in 1982.2 Contrary to a
regional court of appeals'jurisdiction, which is geographically limited,
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is statutorily limited by subject
matter.3 The legislative history indicates the following three purposes
for establishing this court: (1) "reliev[ing] the regional appellate
courts' workload"; (2) "obtain[ing] greater uniformity in patent law

1. 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002).

2. See, e.g., 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ONPATENTS § 11.06[3)[e], at 11-359
(2002) [hereinafter 4 CHIsUM] (noting the Federal Circuit was created in 1982). For
an in-depth review of the evolution and formation of the Federal Circuit, see Steven R.
Trybus, Note, FederalCircuit Jurisdiction: This Court, That Law, 61 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 731, 732-38 (1985).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1338 (2000); see also S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981)
("The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit differs from other Federal courts of
appeals, however, in that its jurisdiction is defined in terms of subject matter rather
than geography."), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13.
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development and application"; and (3) "mak[ing] more effective use
of currently available federal judicial resources." 4 Nevertheless, "[t]he
majority of the legislative history . . . centers on the need for

centralized review of patent appeals." ' Both the Federal Circuit itself
and the Supreme Court have occasionally recognized this uniformitydriven purpose as the reason for establishing the Federal Circuit.'
For various reasons, the Federal Circuit's creation was not without

its critics. Some critics argued that Congress was merely passing the
responsibility of clarifying patent law to thejudiciary rather than doing
so itself.7 The effects of centralizing a specific area of law in a single
court was also vexatious to opponents of the Federal Circuit's
creation.' Critics also feared that creating the Federal Circuit would

lead to the creation of other specialty courts.9 Even the American Bar
Association opposed the creation of the Federal Circuit.'°

In forming the Federal Circuit, Congress exercised its Article III
power to ordain and establish inferior federal courts." The, limited
subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit was defined by
Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1295. In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)

4. 4 CHISUM, supra note 2, § 11.06[3][e], at 11-361 to -363; see also Trybus,
supra note 2, at 736-37 (listing similar purposes for the Federal Circuit's creation).
5. Squillacote v. United States, 747 F.2d 432, 434 (1984).
6. For example, the Supreme Court has noted:
"it was just for the sake of such desirable uniformity that
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as
an exclusive appellate court for patent cases,... observing that
increased uniformity would 'strengthen the United States patent
system in such a way as to foster technological growth and
industrial innovation."'
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,390 (1996) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981)). Similarly, the Federal Circuit stated:
Though this court's exclusive substantive. jurisdiction
encompasses six major areas of national law in which Congress
desired greater uniformity, of which patent law is but one, the
Seventh Circuit correctly noted the congressional emphasis on
the need for greater uniformity in patent law and for freeing the
judicial process from the forum shopping caused by conflicting
patent decisions in the regional circuits.
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 882 F. 2d 1544, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
vacated by 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
7. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 40-41 (providing the additional views of Senator Max
Baucus), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,49-50.
8. See Randall R. Rader, SpecializedCourts: The LegislativeResponse, 40 AM.
U.L. REV. 1003, 1004-05 (1991).
9. Id. at 1005; see also S. REP. No. 97-275, at 41, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 50.
10. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 41, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 50.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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provides that the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction over

appeals from the final decisions of all United States district courts
where the jurisdiction of the district court was based, in whole or in
part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.12 Section 1338(a) states that "[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,

copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright
cases." Thus, when a district court's jurisdiction is based, at least in
part, on the patent laws, the Federal Circuit is given exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. As a result of these interrelated statutes, the

Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is clearly defined with reference to the
basis of a district court's jurisdiction. However, Congress's use of the
phrase "arising under"' 3 in defining the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
has led to problems which the Supreme Court recently resolved, for
4
better or for worse, in Holmes.1
While the establishment of the Federal Circuit was designed to

create uniformity in patent law, 5 the Federal Circuit has never been
entitled to "absolute exclusivity" to decide all patent issues.16 For

instance, issues involving breach or enforcement of a patent license
may be litigated in state court if the claims arise under state contract
law rather than federal patent law. 7 Further, a case does not arise

under federal patent law when the federal patent law issue only
appears in the assertion of a defense while the original claims are

12. The statute 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) provides:
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall have exclusive jurisdiction(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of
the United States, the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern
Mariana Islands, if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in
whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title, except that a case
involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to
copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or trademarks and no
other claims under section 1338(a) shall be governed by sections
1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title.
13. See § 1338(a).
14. 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002).
15. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
16. See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02[1][e], at 21-91 to
-92 (2002) [hereinafter 8 CHISUM] ("[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that state
courts are competent to adjudicate patent questions so long as the action itself does not
arise under the patent laws.").
17. See id.; ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 16.1(b),
at 929 (5th ed. 2001).
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entirely under state law.' 8 Nevertheless, "[a]ny civil action of which
federal district courts have original jurisdiction may, if brought in a
state court, be removed by the defendant to the federal district court
embracing the location of the state court."' 9 The fact remains that,
while the Federal Circuit was created, in part, to ensure uniformity in
patent law, state courts may still decide some patent issues.2"
B.

The Federal Circuit's "Arising Under" Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court's decision in Christiansonv. Colt Industries
OperatingCorp.2 and the Federal Circuit's response to Christianson
in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle

Ltd.2" formthe background of the Federal Circuit'sjurisdiction, or lack
thereof, over cases with patent issues raised only in responsive
pleadings. These two cases ultimately led to the Supreme Court's
recent decision of Holmes. 3
1. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.

In Christiansonthe Supreme Court dealt with the scope of the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction.24 Colt, a "leading" manufacturer, seller,
and marketer of M16 rifles and parts, was the former employer of
Charles R. Christianson.25 After leaving Colt in 1975, Christianson
established International Trade Services, Inc. (ITS), which began
selling M16 parts.26 Christianson, despite signing a nondisclosure
agreement while in the employ of Colt, began utilizing information at
ITS that Colt considered "proprietary. 2 17 Subsequently, Colt filed a
patent infringement suit against two other companies, but it alsojoined
Christianson and ITS for supplying the M16 specifications to the
alleged infringing companies. 8 Colt later dismissed its claims against

18. HARMON, supra note 17, § 16.1 (b), at 929.

19. Id. § 8.1(a)(iv), at 468.
20. Id., § 8.1(a)(i), at 434; see also 8 CHISUM,supra note 16, § 21.02[1][e], at
21-91 ("[S]tate courts are competent to adjudicate patent questions so long as the
action itself does not arise under the patent laws.").
21. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
22. 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
23. 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002).
24. 486 U.S. at 803.

25. Id. at 804.
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Id. at 804-05.
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Christianson and ITS but notified several of their customers that the
company was illegally utilizing Colt's trade secrets.29
Subsequently, Christianson and ITS brought a lawsuit against Colt
under the federal antitrust laws and, as later amended, a state law claim
of tortious interference with business relationships.3 ° Colt defended
and counterclaimed by alleging that Christianson and ITS had
improperly used trade secrets-a claim based on state law.3"
Christianson and ITS answered these allegations, arguing t&iat Colt's
patents were invalid because they failed to satisfy the best mode and
enablement requirements.32 Relying on this argument, the district court
granted summary judgment on the antitrust and tortious-interference
claims and invalidated nine of Colt's patents.33 What followed the
district court's judgment was a game of jurisdictional ping-pong in
which the Supreme Court became a referee.
Colt appealed to the Federal Circuit, which ultimately concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction and, consequently, ordered that the case be
transferred to the Seventh Circuit.3 4 However, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the Federal Circuit did have jurisdiction and was
"clearly wrong" in transferring the case.35 After the case was returned
to the Federal Circuit, the court once again decided that it lacked
jurisdiction but proceeded to decide the case on the merits in the
"interest of justice."36 The Federal Circuit added that the Seventh
Circuit displayed "a monumental misunderstanding of the patent
jurisdiction granted this court. An appeal in a pure and simple antitrust
case is here solely because an issue of patent law appears in an
argument against a defense [or, rather, in the plaintiff s response to a
defense]."3 Following the Federal Circuit's adjudication on the merits,

29. Id. at 805.
30. Christianson,486 U.S. at 805. The complaint by Christianson also contained
an "obscure" paragraph hinting at the invalidity of Colt's patents. Id.
31. Id. at 806.

32. Id. at 806. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002) requires that a patent be
issued only when the applicant satisfies what is commonly referred to as the
"enablement requirement" and the "best mode requirement." Enablement requires
that

the patent applicant disclose information sufficient for aperson "skilled in the art" to
"make and use" the invention while the "best mode" requires that a patent
applicant
disclose any best mode of the invention, if there is one.
33. Christianson,486 U.S. at 806.
34. Id.

35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 807 (citation omitted).
37. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1987), vacated by 486 U.S. 800 (1980).
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the jurisdictional
dispute.38
The Supreme Court agreed that the Federal Circuit did not have
jurisdiction over the case. 39 The Court reasoned that "linguistic
consistency" required that the phrase "arising under" from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) be interpreted in the same manner as other statutes using the
phrase, particularly 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants federal jurisdiction
over federal questions.40 Thus, with linguistic consistency in mind, the
Court held that § 1338(a) jurisdiction extends only to cases where the
"well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law
creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims."4 The Court also stated that "whether a claim 'arises
under' patent law 'must be determined from what necessarily appears
in the plaintiff s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration,
unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses
which it is thought the defendant may interpose."' 42 Because the Court
reasoned that a case could not "arise under" the federal patent laws
based on a defense or the anticipation of a defense, the Federal
Circuit's judgment was vacated and the case was remanded to the
Seventh Circuit.43 The Court found that the Federal Circuit's

jurisdiction is based on the well-pleaded complaint and not the welltried case."

2. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works,OerlikonBuehrle Ltd.
While the Federal Circuit has conformed to the Supreme Court's
Christianson ruling, it has interpreted the holding narrowly. This
narrow interpretation is evident in Aerojet.4 s
Aerojet sued Machine Tool Works and Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd.
(MTW) for unfair competition, interference with prospective
advantage, and false representation and sought a "declaratory

38. Christianson,486 U.S. at 807.
39. See id. at 819.
40. Id. at 808-09.
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 809 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
43. See id. at 809, 819.
44. Christianson,486 U.S. at 809, 814. See infra note 104 and accompanying
text.
45. 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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judgment that trade secrets were not misappropriated."4 6 Federal
subject matter jurisdiction was initially "predicated" under federal
question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) and diversity jurisdiction (28
U.S.C. § 1332). 47 However, as the Federal Circuit expressly noted,
"[n]o reference to patent invalidity, noninfringement, or
'48
unenforceability appears anywhere in Aerojet's complaint.
MTW answered the complaint and counterclaimed for breach of
contract, unfair competition, trade secret misappropriation, false
representation, and patent infringement, and the parties agreed that the
counterclaims were compulsory.

9

The court added that they would

"treat the pleadings as written, i.e., as a complaint based on a claim of
false representation and a counterclaim for, inter alia, patent
infringement."5
The Federal Circuit expressly limited its discussion and holding
to "nonfrivolous compulsory counterclaim[s] for patent infringement
[actions]" originally filed and brought in a federal district court. 5 1 By
doing so, the court intended to expressly limit its holding so that it did
not deal with removal actions or permissive counterclaims.52
The court noted that if MTW's counterclaim for patent
infringement was filed as a complaint, the claim would have fully
complied with the well-pleaded complaint rule and would have been
a sufficient basis to state a cause of action under the federal patent
laws. 53 In keeping with this reasoning, the court stated:
It would seem at best incongruous to hold that we
have appellate jurisdiction when a well-pleaded
patent infringement claim is the basis of a pleading
labeled "complaint" but not when the identicalwellpleaded claim is the basis of a pleading labeled
"counterclaim". [sic] The distinctions between
complaints and counterclaims can be important in
other contexts, but can have no meaningful role in
governing the direction of the appeal under the
unique statute that created this court when the
counterclaim arises under the patent laws.54
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 737.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 738 n.I.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 738 n.1.
Id. at 739.
Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 739.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 742.
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Further, the Aerojet case would not present any of the federal-state
conflicts that typically arise under the well-pleaded complaint rule in
removal actions, which also utilize the "arising under" phraseology."
The Court recognized that "Congress did not require that this
court 'get its hands on every appeal involving an allegation that a
patent issue is somehow involved."' 56 Nevertheless, the court opined
that this was a case in which jurisdiction was present, stating that:
Congress clearly wanted this court to get its hands on
well-pleaded, nonfrivolous claims arising under the
patent laws and thus to maximize the court's chances
of achieving the congressional objectives that
informed the FCIA [the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982]. Congress did not mention the "wellpleaded complaint rule" as such and no warrant
exists for reading that judicially created device into
the statute when doing so would defeat the
congressional purpose. Directing appeals involving
compulsory counterclaims for patent infringement to
the twelve regional circuits could frustrate Congress'
desire to 5 7foster uniformity and preclude forum
shopping.
With these considerations set forth, the Federal Circuit held that
it had appellate jurisdiction over the case because MTW's compulsory
counterclaim rendered the district court's jurisdictional basis to be
based "in part" on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.58 The court reached this
conclusion by noting that the counterclaim asserted had ajurisdictional
basis independent from the original complaint. 9 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court recently reached a different result on this issue in

55. Id. at 743-44.
56. Id. at 744 (quoting Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc. 747 F.2d 1422, 1429

(1987)).
57. Id. at 744.
58. Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 745.
59. Id. The Federal Circuit had previously issued an order stating that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The opinion in which the above reasoning
is set forth was released approximately four months after the initial order. Further, the
jurisdictional issue was taken on by the court in an order stating the issue and inviting

briefs. See id. at 738-739.
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Holmes,6" thereby virtually ignoring, and implicitly overruling, the

rationale set forth in Aerojet.6"
3.

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Systems,
Inc.

Acting twelve years after the Federal Circuit's Aerojet decision,
the Supreme Court overruled Aerojet sub silentio in Holmes.6 2 The
issue in Holmes, essentially identical to the issue in Aerojet, was
"whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has appellate
jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not allege a claim
arising under federal patent law, but the answer contains a patent-law
counterclaim."63 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Supreme Court clearly
answered this question in the negative. 4
Holmes involved Vomado, a manufacturer holding patents for
fans and heaters. 5 Vomado filed a complaint with the United States
International Trade Commission against Holmes Group, Inc., alleging
that Holmes' sale of fans and heaters with a "spiral grill design"
infringed Vornado's patent and trade dress.66 Vomado had also
previously sued a different competitor, Duracraft, for trade dress
infringement of Vomado's "spiral grill design. 67 In that case, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Vornado had "no protectible
trade-dress rights in the grill design." 68 Subsequently, Holmes filed an
action in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that its
products were not infringing Vornado's trade dress and an injunction
restraining Vomado from making such accusations.69 Vornado, in a
compulsory counterclaim, alleged that Holmes was guilty of patent
infringement.7"
The District Court for the District of Kansas granted Holmes'
request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction, explaining that
Vomado was collaterally estopped from asserting its trade-dress rights
because the issue had already been litigated in its action against

60. 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002).
61. The majority only briefly mentions Aerojet in a footnote before dismissing
it completely. Id. at 1895 n.4.
62. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. 1889 passim.

63. Id. at 1892.
64. Id. at 1893-95.
65. Id. at 1892.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Duracraft. 7" The district court also stayed all proceedings related to the
patent infringement counterclaim, stating that the counterclaim would
be dismissed if the declaratory judgment were affirmed on appeal.72
Vomado then appealed to the Federal Circuit.73 Notwithstanding
Holmes' challenge of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, the court
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case.74
However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue
of whether the Federal Circuit properly asserted jurisdiction over the
75
case.

The Court observed that 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for
federal question jurisdiction, contains the same "arising under"
77
language as 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 6 Referring to Christianson,
Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority of the Court, reasoned that "linguistic
consistency" requires that the phrase "arising under" be interpreted in
the same manner for both § 1338(a) and § 1331.78 This interpretation,
established by § 1331 precedent, invokes the well-pleaded complaint
rule and requires that jurisdiction "must be determined from what
necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the
bill or declaration."7 9 According to the Supreme Court, because the
only patent assertion in Holmes appears in the compulsory
counterclaim and not from the plaintiff s well-pleaded complaint, the
Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the case.8"
The Court refused to allow a counterclaim to serve as a basis for
"arising under" jurisdiction, noting that such an approach had been
previously declined.8 This approach, according to the Court, would be
against the "longstanding policies underlying our precedents."82 One

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1892. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the
case for the district court to determine whether another case, which was decided after
the district court's decision but before the appeal, would satisfy the "change in law"
exception to collateral estoppel on the trade dress issue. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 1893. The statute, § 1331, provides, "The district court shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arisingunder the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." (emphasis added).
77. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
78. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1893. The well-pleaded complaint rule is also invoked
in determining whether a case is removable from state court to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). Id. at 1893 n.2.
79. Id. at 1893 (quoting Christianson,486 U.S. at 809).
80. Id.

81. Id. at 1894.
82. Id.
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such policy is that the plaintiff is "the master of the complaint." 3
Under this theory, the plaintiff is capable of foregoing claims under
federal law in order to have his case heard in state court.8 4 Next, the
Court explained that Vornado' s approach would "radically expand the
class of removable cases, contrary to the '[d]ue regard for the rightful
independence of state governments."' 85 Finally, the proposed approach
would "undermine the clarity and ease of administration of the wellpleaded-complaint doctrine."

6

The Court also flatly rejected Vomado's alternative argument that
the "arising under" phrase should be interpreted differently in the
context of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) because of the congressional intent of
creating uniformity in patent law.87 Justice Scalia claimed this
interpretive option was simply not available because the Court's duty
is to determine the fair meaning of the words of the statute and not to
determine Congress's goals in enacting the statute.88
The Court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (the statute conferring
appellate jurisdiction) does not even use the phrase "arising under,"
relying instead on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 9 If § 1295 contained the
"arising under" phrase itself, "[e]ven then the phrase would not be
some neologism that mightjustify our adverting to the general purpose
of the legislation, but rather a term familiar to all law students as
invoking the well-pleaded-complaint rule."9
In summary, the Court reasoned that "[i]t would be an
unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy to say that § 1338(a)'s
'arising under' language means one thing (the well-pleaded-complaint
rule) in its own right, but something quite different (respondent's
complaint-or-counterclaim rule) when referred to by § 1295(a)(1)."'"
As a result of this analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment

83. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1894.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109(1941))
(alteration in original).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1894-95.
88. Id. at 1895.
89. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1895.
90. Id. Neologism is defined as either "a new word, usage, or expression" or "a
meaningless word coined by a psychotic." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 776 (10th ed. 2000). Justice Scalia was presumably using the word in the

context of the former.
91. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1895. Necromancy is defined, in relevant part, as a

"conjuration ofthe spirits of the dead for purposes of magically revealing the future or

influencing the course of events." MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 774
(10th ed. 2000).
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of the Federal Circuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
92
remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with the
Court's assertion that if a compulsory counterclaim were allowed to
serve as ajurisdictional basis, it would be a "neologism" involving "an
unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy."93 His concurrence
argued that there is "well-reasoned precedent" to the contrary,94

including Aerojet, which the majority dismissed as irrelevant.95
Nevertheless, in spite of these comments, Justice Stevens
ultimately agreed with the Court's overall interpretation of the
statute.96 He reasoned that the plaintiffs choice of forum includes
appellate forum as well as trial forum.97 He was also concerned that 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) does not include exclusive appellate jurisdiction
for copyright and trademark claims.98 Because these types of claims
"are not infrequently bound up with patent counterclaims," the Federal
Circuit may inappropriately gain exclusive jurisdiction over these
claims which were expressly excluded by Congress.99 He agreed with

the Court that the decision will maintain "clarity and simplicity" in
appellate jurisdictional rules."' Justice Stevens finally noted that there
are some benefits to having other courts occasionally resolve patent
issues, such as identifying conflicts in decisions that merit the Court's
attention and avoiding institutional bias that a specialized court may
develop.'
In a separate concurring opinion joined by Justice O'Conner,
Justice Ginsburg adopted the approach that the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction is based on the well-tried case.' 2 Under this approach,
which Justice Scalia observed was rejected by the Court in
Christianson,10 3 a compulsory counterclaim that "'aris[es] under'
federal patent law and is adjudicated on the merits by a federal district
court" is within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal

92. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1895.

93. Id. at 1896.
94. Id.

95. See id. at 1895 n.4.
96. Id. at 1896-97.
97. Id. at 1897.
98. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1897.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1898. Justice Stevens particularly notes the benefit of various opinions

in developing the law and also the possibility that courts of broader jurisdiction
occasionally handling a case with patent issues will help to avoid "institutional bias"
that a "specialized court" may develop. Id.
102. Id. at 1898.
103. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1894 n.3.
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Circuit." Justice Ginsburg correctly asserted that the question at issue
does not affect the plaintiff's choice of trial forum.'° 5 Rather, the issue
"concerns Congress's allocation of adjudicatory authority among the
federal courts of appeals."'0 6 Placing an emphasis on Congress's intent
in creating the Federal Circuit and noting that the Court's opinion
"dwells on district court authority," Justice Ginsburg sought to give
effect to congressional intent.'07 However, because Holmes involved
a patent claim that was not adjudicated, she concurred in the judgment,
though her method of reasoning was markedly different.t°8
III. ANALYSIS
In Holmes the Court, with the exception of Justices Ginsburg and
O'Connor, held that a compulsory patent counterclaim is not a
sufficient basis for the Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction.'09 While the
opinion is straightforward, the result is contrary to the congressional
intent underlying the creation of the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, the
outcome of Holmes will likely have a destabilizing effect on the
uniformity of patent law.
A. Holmes is Contrary to CongressionalIntent
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, which established
the Federal Circuit, demonstrates that the Court's opinion is at odds
with congressional intent." 0 Particularly, the legislative history states
that "[t]he Committee intends for the jurisdictional language to be
construed in accordance with the objectives of the Act and these
concerns [of forum shopping].'' 1 Thus, while the Court insists on
giving the words of the statute their "plain meaning," the Court's plain
meaning appears incongruent with any definition that Congress may
have attached to the words. The Court's interpretation simply goes

104. Id. at 1898 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The patent issue was not adjudicated by the district court because the
proceedings relating to the patent infringement counterclaim were stayed pending the
appeal of the other issues decided. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
109. Id. passim.
110. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,
15.
111. Id. at 20, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 30.
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against the Act's intent by reopening the door to forum shopping--the
very thing the Federal Circuit was created to halt.'12
The legislative history does comment that a traditional "arising
under" analysis is to apply to the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction."'
However, the comment was most likely intended to contrast the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction with that of the Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals, a court with jurisdiction over issues and not entire
cases, and was not an expression by Congress that the well-pleaded
complaint rule should apply." 4 The phrase "arising under" was
intended to establish that the Federal Circuit is to have jurisdiction
over entire cases and not merely the patent issues from cases." 5
The legislative history provides that the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction regarding patent cases extends "in the same sense that
cases are said to 'arise under' federal law for purposes of federal
question jurisdiction."" 6 However, at least one commentator has
suggested that "[i]t is doubtful that Congress appreciated the nuances
of the traditional 'arising under' analysis.""' 7 Such doubt is certainly
reasonable because the dilemma of choosing between federal appellate
courts based on the subject matter of a case had not arisen prior to the
Federal Circuit's creation.
B. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Should Not Apply to §
1338(a) When DeterminingAppellate Jurisdiction
Section 1338 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code grants exclusive
jurisdiction to federal district courts for actions that "arise under" the
patent laws. Two different issues may develop under § 1338."'8 First,
there is the original jurisdiction issue, which asks whether a case may
be initially filed in or removed to federal court." 9 This issue requires
a traditional analysis under the well-pleaded complaint rule. The
second possible issue involves determining appellate jurisdiction,

112. See notes 110-11 and discussion infra Part III.C..
113. H.R. REP. No.97-312, at 41 (1981).
114. See John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Indust.
Operating Corp.: The Application of FederalQuestion Precedentto FederalCircuit
JurisdictionDecisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 1860 (1996).
115. See id.
116. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 41.
117. Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 114, at 1861; see also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1,35-36 (1989) ("Congress could not have intended to fully incorporate the wellpleaded complaint rule into the definition of the [Federal Circuits's] power.").
118. Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 114, at 1839 n.14, 1851.
119. Id.
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asking whether a case already properly in federal court is based on
§ 1338, a different jurisdictional basis, or a combination thereof. 121 In
other words, instead of determining whether a case belongs in federal
court, the determination under this second issue is what the
jurisdictional basis is for a case that is already in federal court. This
second determination is necessary because the Federal Circuit only has
appellate jurisdiction when the districtcourt'soriginal jurisdiction was
based, at least in part, on § 1338.21
Although defined by reference to a statute that grants original
jurisdiction to federal district courts, the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction invokes vastly different policies than those invoked by a
district court's original jurisdiction. In particular, the well-pleaded
complaint rule, which was formulated for original federal court subject
matter jurisdiction, is based on policies, discussed infra, that are
simply not present in the context of determining the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction. 122 Because the well-pleaded complaint rule is
based on these policies that are not applicable in determining appellate
jurisdiction, § 1338 should be interpreted without resort to the wellpleaded complaint rule when determining appellate jurisdiction.'23

120. Id.
121. 28U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). This second determination only became necessary
after the Federal Circuit's creation, because appeals prior to its creation simply
proceeded to the regional appellate court without regard to the particular basis of
jurisdiction, beyond diversity and federal questionjurisdiction. Donofrio & Donovan,
supra note 114, at 1851-52.
122. See Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 114, at 1861 ("The Supreme Court
[in Christianson] ... imposed a system that developed in the context of state versus

federal jurisdictional problems and applied it in a federal versus federal context."). The
Donofio and Donovan article provides a thorough argument detailing why the wellpleaded complaint rule is inappropriate in cases already in federal court. The article
generally calls for a modified interpretation of the "arising under" language in
situations such as Holmes where no federal versus state issues are involved. Although
this option is clearly foreclosed after Holmes, the rationale is supportive of the need for
Congress to act legislatively to alter the result of Holmes.
123. Although determining that a district court has jurisdiction by using one
interpretation of § 1338 and then determining what the district court's jurisdiction is
based upon by using a different interpretation of § 1338 may be admittedly
counterintuitive, this method is necessary to give effect to the different policies
underlying original jurisdiction as compared with appellate jurisdiction, discussed
infra. The alternative option exists that a district court's jurisdiction is based only on
those grounds that conferred original jurisdiction. This alternative is in force after
Holmes. However, as discussed infra, this method does not give effect to the policies
underlying the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the two differing
interpretations of§ 1338 are necessary. Any aspect of this related to this approach that
is against intuition may be attributed to Congress's decision to define the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction by reference to a district court's jurisdiction.
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However, the well-pleaded complaint rule still applies to § 1338 when
determining original subject matter jurisdiction.
As discussed above, the well-pleaded complaint rule is based on
policies that are not pertinent in the context of determining appellate
jurisdiction. In particular, the Court in Holmes noted the policy of the
plaintiff serving as "master of the complaint." '24 The opinion stated
that the well-pleaded complaint rule allows a plaintiff to eschew
federal law claims in order to have the case'heard in state court. 25
Because the Holmes case already had original jurisdiction in federal
court, this concern was simply not at issue in the context of the case
before the Court. The Court could have completely avoided this policy
concern by limiting its holding to cases, such as Holmes, where § 1338
is being interpreted solely for determining appellate jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, as Justice Ginsburg properly noted, the Court dwelled
on district court authority 126 by extending (without question) the
plaintiffs right to choose the trial forum to the right to choose the
appellate forum. Ironically, this choice of appellate forum that the
Court extends to the plaintiff is precisely what Congress sought to
curtail with the creation of the Federal Circuit.'27
Second, the Court observed that allowing a counterclaim to
establish "arising under"jurisdiction would "radically expand the class
of removable cases, contrary to the '[d]ue regard for the rightful
independence of state governments' that our cases addressing removal
require."' 28 However, this conclusion is misguided. As noted above,
Holmes only involved a determination of appellate jurisdiction, which
is different from removal cases that involve determinations of original
jurisdiction. 29 The scope of removal jurisdiction would have
remained unaffected if the Court distinguished between interpreting §
1338 for determining appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction,
and then limited its holding to the former. By such a distinction, the
"rightful independence of state governments" would still remain
protected by the continued application of the traditional "arising
under" analysis still to determinations of original jurisdiction.

124. 122 S. Ct. 1889, 1894 (2002).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1898; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 117, at 36 ("The Supreme Court
[in Christianson]also did not bother to examine whether the well-pleaded complaint
rule, which has been used exclusively to define trial courtjurisdiction, was appropriate
for appellate courts. Had it done so, it might have realized that there are significant
differences between trial and appellate tribunals.").
127. See discussion infra Part III.A.

128. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1894 (quoting Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941)) (alteration in original).

129. See id. at 1892.
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Also underlying the well-pleaded complaint rule is the goal of
providing a mechanism for federal courts to quickly determine if they
have jurisdiction over a case so that time is not wasted developing a
case where no jurisdiction exists.13° However, this policy is irrelevant
for determining whether a regional circuit or the Federal Circuit will
handle the appeal because the determination need not be made
immediately when the case is initially filed. 3' While the difficulty may
arise in determining which appellate court's precedent should be
followed, the Federal Circuit's choice of law practice serves to reduce
this difficulty. In particular, the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit
law to non-patent issues, and this should alleviate the problem of a
district court having to decide which precedent to follow.'32
C. The PracticalImplications of Holmes
As the legislative history notes, the Federal Circuit was designed,
in part, to "alleviate the serious problems of forums shopping among
the regional courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive
jurisdiction in one court of appeals." '33 Using a single appellate forum
to resolve patent disputes has been somewhat effective. 3 4 However,
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes, the ability of the
plaintiff to plead claims strategically, or to be an "artful pleader,"
creates the opportunity to have issues litigated outside the Federal
Circuit that should be within the Federal Circuit's exclusive appellate
jurisdiction.'35

130. See Dreyfuss, supra note 117, at 36.
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., HARMON, supra note 17, § 18.3, at 1086 ("The court applies
regional circuit law, to the extent it can be discerned, on all but the substantive issues
reserved especially to it ....). However, commentators have recently begun criticizing
the Federal Circuit for abandoning this choice of law concept with regard to some nonpatent issues. See, e.g., James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay of PatentRights
and Antitrust Restraints in the FederalCircuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137 (200 1)
(discussing the Federal Circuit's treatment of and choice of law regarding antitrust
issues).
133. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 19 (1981), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29.
134. See HARMON, supra note 17, at ix (noting that the Federal Circuit's job is
"to increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law" and "[i]t would be
chauvinistic in the extreme for this author to suggest that the court has in any way
failed to do that job); Dreyfuss, supra note 117, at 74 ("On the whole, the [Federal
Circuit] experiment has worked well for patent law, which is now more uniform, easier
to apply, and more responsive to national interests.").
135. "According to Chief Judge H. Robert Mayer of the Federal Circuit, who
spoke in an interview, Holmes is likely to limit the availability of Federal Circuit
review and permit forum shopping, and both results may return the state of patent law
to that existing before the Federal Circuit's creation, a situation in which the diversity
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By way of example, a plaintiff may plead an antitrust claim, which
is not within the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction, while being
aware that the defendant will be forced to make a compulsory
counterclaim on similarly related patent issues" 6 under Rule 13(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 137 Hence, the patent
counterclaim, which has an independent jurisdictional basis, is
adjudicated, but the Federal Circuit is avoided simply because of the
artful pleading of the original plaintiff. Thus, the uniformity of patent
law, which was to be developed in the federal system by a single
appellate court, is jeopardized because the Holmes decision opens the
3
door to alternative jurisdictions by way of artful pleading. 1
Connected with the concept of using artful pleading to accomplish
forum shopping, the Holmes decision may also create a "race to the
courthouse." This situation is likely when a potential plaintiff sends a
letter to cease-and-desist to a potential defendant, alleging infringing
activities. The potential defendant may subsequently file a suit, similar
to the example described above, including only non-patent claims
while knowing that the potential plaintiff, now the defendant, will be
forced to make a patent counterclaim.
The likelihood of forum shopping and races to the courthouse is
high for one major reason: the Federal Circuit has been described as
being "pro-patent" or "patent friendly."' 39 Alleged patent infringers
may seek to avoid the Federal Circuit in favor of a regional circuit
court that may be less "patent friendly." Further, the regional courts of
appeals are not bound to follow the Federal Circuit's precedent, even

in the application of the patent laws reduced the value of patents." Anne M. Maher,
The 'Holmes' Decision, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 2002, at B 11.
136. See Bruce M. Wexler & Joseph M. O'Malley, Jr., DecidingJurisdictionin
PatentAppeals: U.S. Supreme Court Vacates FederalCircuitRuling andOpens Door
to Forum Shopping, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at S3 ("Patent claims are commonly
asserted as counterclaims in antitrust cases.").
137. The rule requires counterclaims to be asserted if they arise from the same
transaction or occurrence of the opposing party's claim.
138. See, e.g., Wexler & O'Malley, supra note 136 ("But, whether or not
[Holmes], has a dramatic effect on the development of patent law, it is almost certain
to introduce some strategic forum shopping, pleading strategies and races to the

courthouse ....).
139. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 117, at 26 ("The anecdotal evidence suggests
that the [Federal Circuit] is a good court for patentees."); Wexler & O'Malley, supra
note 136 ("[T]he Federal Circuit has been viewed at times as pro-patent and hostile to
antitrust claims.").
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on patent issues, because the Federal Circuit is only equal to other
federal appellate courts.'4 °
D. PossibleRemedial Measures

While the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction appears to be at odds with the congressional intent of
creating the Federal Circuit and the policies underlying the wellpleaded complaint rule, the option of "arising under" obtaining a
different judicial interpretation of § 1295 is now highly unlikely.' 4'
Nevertheless, Congress is not without a remedy. The Holmes decision
turned entirely on statutory interpretation; hence, Congress may
legislatively alter the result in Holmes by simply altering the statute.
One possibility is that Congress may rewrite the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction so that it covers appellate jurisdiction over cases properly
in federal court that have any patent claims or defenses. The general
use of the word claims should include claims made by any party.
Furthermore, by including defenses within the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction, the goal of uniformity in patent law will be
given greater effect. Therefore, in order to give effect to the goals of
uniformity in patent law and alleviating forum shopping in patent
cases, the Federal Circuit should also have jurisdiction over cases that
include patent claims by any party and/or patent defenses.
Another option that Congress may consider for altering the
statutory construction of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is the
concept of the well-tried case that was rejected by the Court in both
Christianson142 and Holmes 4 This option could be implemented by
a statute that grants the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over
cases where patent claims are actually adjudicated. One possible
criticism of this approach is the potential of multiple appellate forums
for a single case. For instance, consider a case where a patent claim
was not originally adjudicated and the case was appealed to a regional
appellate court. Subsequently, the regional appellate court remanded
the case and the patent claim was then adjudicated. Under the welltried case approach, the next appeal of the case would be to the
Federal Circuit. However, this change in appellate forums on different
appeals is of little concern because the Federal Circuit would likely be

140. See S.REP. NO. 97-275, at 2-3 (1981) ("The new [Federal Circuit] court is
on line with other Federal courts of appeals, that is, it is not a new tier in the judicial
structure."), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12-13.
141. See supra note 124.
142. 486 U.S. 800, 814 (1988).
143. 122 S. Ct. 1889, 1894 n.3 (2002).
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applying the regional circuit law on all non-patent issues. Further, the
panel ofjudges for each appeal within the same forum would likely be
different on each appeal, and no consistency is lost by changing
forums when the panel ofjudges would likely have changed anyway.
In addition, the well-tried case does not need to be limited to claims
that were adjudicated. For the same purpose of furthering uniformity
in patent law that was discussed with the first alternative set forth
above, Congress should extend the well-tried case doctrine to cases
where any patent issues were adjudicated, including both claims and
defenses.
There is a principal distinction between the two suggested
approaches set forth supra. Appeals under the first approach would
proceed to the Federal Circuit based on the pleadings, whether the
patent issue were actually adjudicated or not. However, under the
well-tried case approach, the Federal Circuit would only have
jurisdiction where the patent issue were actually adjudicated. Thus,
the well-tried case approach appears more appropriate because the
policies underlying the Federal Circuit are not implicated when the
patent issue is not actually adjudicated.
IV. CONCLUSION
For better or for worse, the Supreme Court has clearly stated its
position on the issues set forth in this Note. At this point, if Congress's
intent in creating the Federal Circuit was to create uniformity in patent
law and to alleviate forum shopping, and if the jurisdictional statute is
to be interpreted in light of these goals, then Congress's remedy now

is to act legislatively in response to the Court's holding in Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air CirculationSystems, Inc. Otherwise, any

uniformity in patent law that has been established through the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit may now be compromised
by the artful pleader who avoids the Federal Circuit in favor of another
court.
Ashley B. Summer
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